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1 Introduction
Adverse product effects are a serious economic problem. As a result of in-
formation disadvantages, consumers may be unaware of some low-quality
aspects of products, for example, harmful radiation from computer moni-
tors or cell-phones, health risks due to nanoparticles or artificial sweeteners
in food, and side effects of medicines. A profit-seeking firm may use many
ingredients in different degrees for the production of products. Such ingredi-
ents are supposed to improve the performance of the product or reduce the
cost of production. However, these substances may have adverse effects on
consumer well-being. Not only may such adverse effects be uncertain and of
unknown degree but the consumer may initially be unaware that, by consum-
ing, they expose them to such a risk. More examples are asbestos, nicotine,
transgenic fats, and flavor enhancers, whose health risks are or were largely
unknown by the consumers. The recent debate on genetically modified agri-
cultural products has a similar flavor: Firms use products with certain genetic
modifications; consumers are imperfectly informed about the degree of such
modifications and whether such modifications are harmful.
In this paper, we consider two classes of information problems on the
consumer side: uncertainty and unawareness. To model uncertainty on the
consumer side, we develop a simple fully Bayesian model. To model unaware-
ness, we develop a simple model in which consumers suffer from a biased
prior. The main contribution of the paper is that we provide a simple model
that allows us to highlight the conceptual differences between consumer un-
awareness and consumer uncertainty.
Formally, with some probability, some characteristic of a product by a
firm creates health problems for consumers. Otherwise, this characteristic
does not affect the well-being of consumers. In the “uncertainty” model,
consumers are aware of the substance but uncertain of the level of the sub-
stance and whether the substance is harmful. In the unawareness model
consumers are not aware of the existence of the substance at all. The mo-
nopolist firm knows whether the substance is harmful or not and the level
of it. He then decides about his disclosure policy: He may fully, partially, or
not at all disclose information through advertising.
The main results are as follows. First, social welfare may be higher with
unaware consumers than that with aware consumers. Intuitively, a monop-
olist always sets a price higher than the social optimal level. This leads to
too little consumption in the market with complete information. Hiding in-
formation, however, leads to too much consumption. The distortions created
by monopoly and hiding information go in the opposite directions. Hence, in
the presence of monopoly power, hiding information is not necessarily detri-
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mental to welfare. However, the conclusion with respect to consumer surplus
is unambiguous: Consumers are always better off if they are aware.
Second, from a policy perspective, mandatory information disclosure makes
unaware consumers better off. In a market with unaware consumers we dis-
tinguish between full and partial mandatory disclosure. Partial disclosure
refers to informing consumers that a particular substance is harmful, full
disclosure refers to also disclosing which amount of the harmful substance
the product contains. Partial disclosure makes consumers better off if they
are initially unaware of the potentially adverse effect, while it is neutral if
they are initially aware. We show that consumers are not necessarily better
off if full instead of partial disclosure is mandated. The reason is that impos-
ing full disclosure may lead to non-participation of the monopolist that may
be consumer surplus reducing.
In an extension, we consider the situation of a mix of aware and unaware
consumers. In this extension it is interesting to study what happens if ini-
tially a larger share of consumers becomes aware of adverse effects–such a
change in the composition of the population may come from public awareness
campaigns that increase the share of aware consumers. If there is a sufficiently
large share of aware consumers, the firm has a stronger incentive to advertise
if it has a moderate level of the potentially harmful ingredient.1 Such adver-
tising further increases the share of aware consumers because advertising is
only imperfectly targeted.
Related Literature: In information disclosure problems, uncertainty
problems have the feature that consumers are uncertain in the sense that
they know the distribution of the relevant unknown attribute, although they
do not know the exact value the attribute takes. The underlying adverse
selection problem can be solved through voluntary information disclosure
by the firm. It is well-known that, if such disclosure is costless, full unrav-
elling results and the adverse selection problem is fully solved. See, e.g.,
Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and
Roberts (1986), and the generalized model by Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite,
and Suzumura (1990). However, as also holds in our setting, if disclosure
is costly no or only partial unravelling will occur (see, e.g., Shavell, 1994).
After disclosure, consumers update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion upon
observing firms’ disclosure actions. With respect to the contracting literature
on information disclosure, we refer to the overview provided in chapter 5 in
1A similar effect is also present in the work by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) who consider
a competitive market in which some consumer are unaware of add-ons. They show that
firms are more likely to disclose the add-on if the fraction of aware consumers in the
population is higher.
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Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
The law and economics literature has used the above approach to address
consumer protection issues.2 In the legal literature, Korobkin (2003) recom-
mends ex ante intervention by legislatures; this corresponds to mandatory
information disclosure rule. However, this ex ante mechanism sometimes in-
efficiently excludes firms from the market as information disclosure is costly
as we show in this paper. Polinsky and Shavell (2006) compare mandatory to
voluntary disclosure rules in a setting in which two firms decide whether to
acquire information. They show that firms may have less incentive to acquire
information under mandatory disclosure. We note that if the legislator can
require the seller to disclose all the possibly harmful substances, it matters
how the seller discloses the eye-opening information. If the seller puts the
information only in fine print, the seller’s action constitutes mis-selling if the
information does not reach the consumers.
Other work has considered ex post judicial mechanisms. In the economics
literature, Daughety and Reinganum (1995) and Daughety and Reinganum
(2008) examine the firm’s behavior when the firm is liable to make a payment
in the event of harm. However, in our context, harm is often not contractible.
Thus, this judicial mechanism has limited applicability.3
According to a different class of informational problems, unaware con-
sumers do not know the attribute and do not know that they do not know
it and so on so forth. To analyze this class of information problems, one has
to give up common knowledge of the game (and rationality), and assume
a non-common prior between firm and consumers. Epistemic foundations
are provided by Board and Chung (2006), Galanis (2007), Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (2006), and Li (2009) in the unawareness literature. From a
normative viewpoint, the consumers’ prior is biased, unless they are made
aware. This non-common prior approach has been used in a number of
recent behavioral-IO models–see, e.g., present-biased consumers (Della Vi-
gna and Malmendier, 2004) and the extension to diversely naive consumers
(Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006), consumers who are unaware of some options (Eliaz
and Spiegler, 2008), consumers who are unaware of some add-ons (Gabaix
2See, e.g., Shavell (2004) for extensive discussions of the law and economics literature
on this issue. A different remedy with respect to adverse effects is to define minimum
quality standards that refer to product safety or product quality (see, e.g., Leland, 1979,
and Shapiro, 1983).
3It is worth mentioning that some legal scholars suggest another ex-post judicial mech-
anism (see Korobkin, 2003, and Becher, 2008): By using the unconsionability doctrine to
interpret contracts, contracts with unconscionable terms (which, thus, put one party at
the mercy of the other) are not enforced. Unfortunately, this mechanism appears to be of
little help in our context because its implementation is difficult in the presence of adverse
effects.
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and Laibson, 2006), analogy-based-reasoning consumers (Mullainathan et al.,
2008), limited-recall consumers (Shapiro, 2006), consumers who are suscep-
tible to the law of small numbers (Spiegler, 2006).4 Our paper adds to this
literature by taking a closer look at information disclosure rules, highlighting
the difference between a market inhabited by consumers that lack informa-
tion but do not have biased beliefs and one in which consumers do have
biased beliefs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model with aware consumers and unaware consumers, respectively. Section
3 examines the welfare consequence and discusses the information disclosure
policies. Section 4 contains two extensions: a setting with moral hazard and
a setting in which aware and unaware consumers coexist. The last section
concludes.
2 Information Disclosure with Aware and Un-
aware Consumers
2.1 The Model
We present an adverse selection model in which a monopolist sells a single
product to a unit mass of consumers. Consumers are aware of the existence of
the product and know the utility from its intended use. However, the firm’s
product contains a potentially harmful substance (e.g., asbestos, nicotine,
artificial sweeteners, genetically modified products etc.). The monopolist
incurs constant marginal costs of production that are normalized to zero.
He sets his price (or, equivalently, quantity) and his information disclosure
policy, as will be specified below. We assume that the firm knows the exact
quality of the product (i.e., whether or not the substance is harmful and
which amount of it is used). Thus we rule out the problem of quality test
(see, e.g., Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985).
We introduce the possibility of unawareness about adverse effects into a
linear-quadratric representative-consumer model. In the context of informa-
tion disclosure policies, this model has been used by Daughety and Rein-
4In psychology, the related concept of awareness is availability (see Kahneman and
Tversky, 1973). For an alternative Bayesian approach of modeling contracting with un-
awareness, see Tirole (2009). Zhao (2009) extends Tirole (2009) to a model with asym-
metric awareness between a seller and a buyer and focuses on the transaction cost of
pre-contractual cognition of the buyer. By contrast, in this paper, unaware consumers are
biased in the sense they are naive; thus there is no pre-contractual cognition involved.
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ganum (2005).5 We refer to the model with aware consumers if consumers
are aware of the potentially adverse effect; however, absent information dis-
closure, they lack information about whether such adverse effects are present
and about the magnitude of these effects. We refer to the model with unaware
consumers if consumers are not aware that there are potentially adverse ef-
fects, unless such information is disclosed. In effect, they have a biased prior.
We aim at developing a simple framework to analyze the difference of
market environments with aware vs unaware consumers. To do so, we need
some notation: We denote
• θ as the amount of the substance, uniformly drawn from [0, 1];
• I as an indicator which takes value I = 1 if the substance is harmful
and I = 0 otherwise;
• p as the per-unit price of the product and q as the quantity sold by the
monopolist.
• x as the probability that the substance is harmful;
• a ≡ α − Iθ as the true quality measure (net of any adverse effects) of
the product, where α is a parameter that shifts the willingness-to-pay
function and reflects the consumer’s preference when abstracting from
possible adverse effects;
• ea as the expected quality according to consumer beliefs.
For simplicity, we assume that θ and I are independent. We postulate
that the utility function of the representative consumer takes the standard
linear-quadratic form
U = (α− Iθ)q − 1
2
q2 − pq.
The firm may disclose information through advertising at a fixed cost
c > 0. Advertising is, thus, by definition, truthful.6
5We have checked that our results also hold in a heterogeneous consumer model with
unit demand and a uniform distribution of the willingness-to-pay.
6This can be motivated by measures taken against misleading or false advertising. Such
advertising about product characteristics is thus within the domain of informative advertis-
ing. However, since unaware consumers have biased beliefs advertising changes consumer
preferences for the product at the moment of purchase–this is a feature of persuasive
advertising. In contrast to work on persuasive advertising, in our setting advertising “cor-
rects” consumer preferences–i.e., ex post preferences are the true preferences. For a
monopoly model of persuasive advertising that allows for distorted preferences ex ante or
ex post, see Dixit and Normann (1978); for a survey on the economics of advertising, see
Bagwell (2007).
6
The timing of the game played by monopolist and consumers evolves as
follows:
1. Nature chooses θ and I.
2. The monopolist observes θ and I–this is his private information. He
then chooses if it partially or fully discloses information through adver-
tising and sets its price p. If the firm advertises, it chooses to disclose
θ and/or I.
3. Consumers observe the price and, if applicable, the advertisement and
then make their purchasing decision.
Notice that the consumer’s decisions only depend on the consumer’s ex-
pected quality. It is straightforward to obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Independent of whether the representative consumer is aware or
not, the market outcomes are characterized as follows:
1. If ea > 0–i.e., the representative consumer’s expected quality is greater
than zero– the consumer buys a strictly positive quantity of the product.
The equilibrium price is p = ha
2
and quantity is q = ha
2
; the gross profit
of the firm is ha
2
4
. In equilibrium, the representative consumer’s utility
level is
CSha,a =
a
2
ea− 3
8
ea2,
and the total surplus is
TSha,a =
a
2
ea− 1
8
ea2.
2. If ea ≤ 0, the firm does not produce.
Notice that in the case where consumers buy the product, adopting a
consumer welfare standard, it is optimal to have ea = 2a/3. The consumers
should have a downward bias in this belief about product quality, ea < a,
due to asymmetric information between the firm and consumers. However,
adopting a total welfare standard, it would be optimal for the consumer to
have biased beliefs ea = 2a. The reason is that the consumer’s upward bias
in the belief about quality, ea < a, counteracts the social underproduction in
monopoly that would result under unbiased beliefs.
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2.2 Aware Consumers
As a benchmark model let us first analyze the model under the assumption
that consumers are aware of the substance but uncertain of the level of θ and
its presence in the product I. The main goal is to derive welfare measures–
i.e., consumers surplus and total surplus, for further comparison.
Denote eaN the consumers’ expected quality level in the absence of adver-
tising. By the unravelling argument (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981, and Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986), if the firm advertises, the firm will disclose both I and
θ; note that there would be full unravelling if c = 0. Thus, the firm with
quality a will advertise if and only if
a2
4
− c ≥ max{0, ea2N
4
}.
There are two cases to consider, depending on whether eaN is positive or
not. Denote ba the cutoff value of the quality at which the firm is indifferent
between advertising and no advertising.
Case 1: eaN ≥ 0. Then the firm with quality a advertises if
a ≥ ba =q4c+ ea2N . (1)
To make things interesting, we assume that α is not too small:
Assumption 1 α > 16c+1
4
.
The assumption rules out the trivial case in which the cost of information
disclosure c is too large such that the firm will never advertise.7
By Bayes’ rule, the consumers’ conditional expectation is (using the uni-
formity assumption)
eaN = E[a|a ≤ ba] = ba+ α− 1
2
. (2)
If c is not too large, the firm advertises with positive probability–i.e.,
with realizations of a above the critical value ba in the solution. Combining
expressions (1) and (2), we obtain
eaN = 2
3
α+
1
3
√
12c− 2α+ α2 + 1− 2
3
. (3)
7When c is not too large advertising by some firm types takes place if and only if
α >
p
4c+ ea2N . For the firm with a = α to have an strict incentive to advertise, eaN = α− 12 .
Hence, we must have α >
q
4c+
¡
α− 12
¢2
which is equivalent to α > (16c+ 1)/4.
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In case 1, the consumer consumes a positive amount of the good at the
profit-maximizing price. Equation (3) implies that eaN ≥ 0 if and only if
1− 2
√
c ≤ α, (4)
i.e., the cost of advertising is not too high compared to the highest quality
of the product.
We now have that
ba = 1
3
α+
2
3
√
12c− 2α+ α2 + 1− 1
3
.
Notice that ba is increasing in c. The advertising cost reduces the proba-
bility of information disclosure ex ante. Clearly, if c is equal to zero, there is
full information disclosure due to unravelling. Note that in this case ba does
not depend on x since the unraveling logic implies that the consumer knows
for sure the substance is harmful if there is no advertising.
Lemma 1 implies the following results:
If I = 0, the firm discloses I and θ and consumers learn that a = α. The
firm’s net profit is α
2
4
− c, and the consumer’s net utility level is α2
8
.
If I = 1 and a > ba, (i.e., θ sufficiently small) the firm discloses I and θ
and consumers learn a. The firm’s profit is a
2
4
− c, and the consumers’ utility
level is a
2
8
.
If I = 1 and a < ba, the firm does not advertise. As follows from Lemma
1, the firm’s profit is ha
2
N
4
, and the consumers’ utility level is ahaN
2
− 3ha
2
N
8
.
The expected consumer surplus is
CSA1 = x
µZ ea
α−1
µ
aeaN
2
− 3ea2N
8
¶
da+
Z α
ea
a2
8
da
¶
+ (1− x) α
2
8
. (5)
The expected total surplus is
TSA1 = x
µZ ea
α−1
µea2N
4
+
aeaN
2
− 3ea2N
8
¶
da+
Z α
ea
µ
a2
4
− c+ a
2
8
¶
da
¶
+ (1− x)
µ
α2
4
− c+ α
2
8
¶
. (6)
Case 2: eaN < 0. In this case, if the firm does not advertise, the consumers
will buy zero quantity. The firm advertises if and only if its profit after
advertising a
2
4
− c is positive, or equivalently, a > ba with ba = 2√c. If there
is a positive probability of advertising ex ante, it is necessary that ba < α.
For this to be the case, we have to assume that α > 2
√
c which is implied by
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Assumption 1. The reason is that if the firm will disclose information in case
the consumers’ expected quality is positive, the firm with the same quality
will also disclose information if consumers’ expected quality is negative. The
expected consumer surplus is
CSA2 = x
Z α
ea
a2
8
da+ (1− x) α
2
8
. (7)
The expected total surplus in this case is
TSA2 = x
Z α
ea
µ
a2
4
− c+ a
2
8
¶
da+ (1− x)
µ
α2
4
− c+ α
2
8
¶
. (8)
Combining cases 1 and 2, we define the consumer surplus measure as
CSA ≡
½
CSA1 if eaN ≥ 0,
CSA2 if eaN < 0.
We return to these surplus measures when comparing market environments
in which consumers are aware to those in which they are unaware.
2.3 Unaware Consumers
The analysis with unaware consumers is straightforward and welfare mea-
sures are easily calculated. Absent information disclosure, consumers are
unaware of the potential adverse effect–i.e., consumers naively believe thatea = α if there is no advertisement about the substance. Therefore, no adver-
tisement leads to the firm’s maximal net profit α
2
4
. Hence, the firm does not
advertise in a market with unaware consumers. Thus in the second class of
information problems there is zero advertising independent of the cost level.
The firm does not have an incentive to solve the information problem con-
sumers face because they are not aware of it. This result is in contrast to
the case where the consumers are aware in which there is full information
disclosure if the cost of advertising is zero.
If I = 0, the consumer’s ex post utility level is α
2
8
. If I = 1, the consumers’
ex post utility level is aα
2
− 3α2
8
, as follows from Lemma 1.
The expected consumer surplus is
CSU = x
Z α
α−1
µ
aα
2
− 3α
2
8
¶
da+ (1− x) α
2
8
. (9)
The expected total surplus is
TSU = x
Z α
α−1
µ
aα
2
− α
2
8
¶
da+ (1− x)
µ
α2
4
+
α2
8
¶
. (10)
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3 Surplus Comparison and Mandatory Dis-
closure Rules
3.1 Surplus Comparison
In this section, we obtain an ambiguous result about the impact of consumer
awareness on total surplus. However, consumers are always better off if they
are aware.
Proposition 1 Welfare may increase or decrease if all consumers become
aware–i.e., TSU − TSA is of ambiguous sign–while consumers are better
off if they are aware–i.e., CSU < CSA.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
The intuition that social welfare may be higher with unaware consumers
than that with aware consumers is simple. We note that a monopoly seller
always sets a price higher than the social optimal level. This leads to too lit-
tle consumption in the market with complete information. If consumers are
unaware of the potentially adverse effect they consume a larger quantity: if
the firm hides information consumer demand is larger since the adverse effect
shifts the consumers’ willingness-to-pay downward. Thus, the distortions cre-
ated by monopoly and unawareness go in opposite directions. Consequently,
in the presence of market power, consumer unawareness is not necessarily
detrimental to welfare measured as total surplus. Consequently, whether
total surplus with aware consumers exceeds that with unaware consumers
depends on the value the parameters take. If the bias of the consumer is
small–i.e., x is small–or, relative to the scale of the harmful substance, the
quality α is large, then the total surplus with unaware consumer is larger
than with aware consumers. On the other hand, if the bias of the consumer
is large and the quality is small relative to the scale of harmful substance,
then the total surplus with aware consumer may be larger.
The conclusion with respect to consumer surplus is unambiguous: CSU <
CSA. It does not depend on our specific assumption about the parameter
values. We observe that aware consumers always obtain a higher surplus than
unaware consumers: In comparison to aware consumers unaware consumers
purchase too much and thereby obtain a lower surplus.
To summarize, while unawareness of adverse effects counteract monopoly
distortions from a total welfare perspective, consumers are always worse off
if they are unaware.
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3.2 Mandatory Disclosure Rules
In this section we turn to consumer protection policies that may be intro-
duced by the regulator or consumer protection authority. In particular, we
explore the implications of two different information disclosure policies. The
first policy is mandatory full information disclosure, according to which the
firm must reveal all the information that it has–i.e., I and θ. The resulting
situation is one of full information. Alternatively, the firm is only forced to
reveal I (or, equivalently, the public authority performs its own analysis and
reveals the realization of I to consumer.) With this mandatory partial infor-
mation disclosure in place, consumers learn whether a substance is harmful
but the firm is not required to reveal the amount of the substance that is con-
tained in the product. In this case, if the firm is forced to reveal I we assume
that revelation of I is not very costly, in contrast to the revelation of θ, since
the message of I can be easily communicated in the content part of mass
media–this information can be released by the firm or the public authority
(to which the firm has reported). In particular, we assume that this cost is
zero. However, if the firm reveals the exact amount of the substance θ and
communicates the meaning of the amount to the consumers, it has to incur
cost c. Note that the model with mandatory partial information disclosure is
formally equivalent to our previous model with aware consumers.8 Thus, to
evaluate the impact of information disclosure on consumers, we have to com-
pare consumer surplus of the three models analyzed above: the model with
fully informed consumers, aware (but uninformed) consumers, and unaware
consumers.
Assume first that there is a mandatory information disclosure rule such
that the firm is required to disclose all its information. Mandatory informa-
tion disclosure then leads to the full-information outcome. The firm’s profit
is a
2
4
− c for a ≥
√
4c and zero otherwise, and the consumer’s utility level is
a2
8
.
Under condition (4), the firm will sell under mandatory disclosure of I
and θ independent of its type a. Then the consumer surplus CSM under
mandatory information disclosure rule is always greater than CSA. To prove
this, notice that CSA only depends on the threshold value ba, and CSM =
8Recall that we call consumers aware if they are aware of the substance but uncertain
of the value I and the level of θ. However, the regulator’s disclosure of the harm I does
not play any role for aware consumers because if I = 0, the firm will disclose this itself.
Suppose I = 1, if the firm does not disclose θ, consumers know that the substance is
harmful. The cutoff value is the same as before.
If consumers are unaware, disclosing I makes all consumers aware whether or not the
substance is harmful. Hene, the regulator’s disclosure of the harm is equivalent to the
policy of making all consumers aware.
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CSA |ea=0. Hence, it is sufficient for us to show that CSA is a decreasing
function of ba. Here, we indeed have
∂CSA
∂ba = x
µbaeaN
2
− 3ea2N
8
+
Z ea
α−1
µ
a
4
− 3eaN
8
¶
da− ba2
8
da
¶
= −x (eaN − (α− 1))2
8
< 0.
However, when condition (4) is violated, the firm does not sell if it is of
sufficiently low quality and expected consumer surplus is
CSM = x
Z α
√
4c
a2
8
da+ (1− x) α
2
8
=
(1− x) 3α2 + xα3 − 8c 32x
24
.
The question is which disclosure policy is better. Here, we obtain the
surprising result that more mandated full information disclosure is not nec-
essarily beneficial to consumers.
Proposition 2 Mandatory information disclosure makes unaware consumers
better off. However, consumers are potentially worse off if full instead of par-
tial disclosure is mandated.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
The intuition for the result that full disclosure can be worse than partial
disclosure is that imposing a mandatory disclosure rule may lead to non-
participation of the monopolist. If the monopolist was not allowed to quit
the market (and, thus, his participation constraint could be ignored), we
always would have CSA < CSM–this holds for the same reason as in the
case that condition (4) holds.
Our result can be given a different interpretation: If CSU < CSM <
CSA, mandatory full information disclosure makes aware consumers worse
off, while it makes unaware consumers better off. For the other two orderings
the qualitative effect of mandatory full disclosure is the same for aware and
unaware consumers alike.
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4 Extensions
4.1 Moral hazard
Our analysis is easily modified to allow for unobservable effort in the reduc-
tion of the amount of the substance, θ.
Remark 1 Suppose that the amount of the substance θ is determined by the
firm, and reducing this amount is costly. Let the cost function be K(θ) ≥ 0
such that K is decreasing, convex, and K(1) = K 0(1) = 0. We can then
show that the firm reduces the amount of the substance if consumers are
made aware of the potentially adverse product effects.
To see this, let, for simplicity, the cost of advertising c be zero. If con-
sumers are aware but uncertain, then, knowing that the realization of I is 1,
the firm solves the following problem
max
θ
pq −K(θ).
By the unravelling arguments, the consumers always learn the amount of θ
in equilibrium. Thus the firm with I = 1 solves the following problem
max
θ
(α− θ)2
4
−K(θ).
For the sake of the argument, suppose that α − 1 > 0. Thus all firms will
participate. (Otherwise, there would be zero pricing and zero quantity.)
Under this assumption, θ = 1 is never optimal (using the properties of K)
and the firm takes a costly action to reduce the amount of the substance.
Qualitatively, we obtain the same result if the firm has to invest in the
reduction of θ even before knowing the realization of I.
If, on the other hand, the consumers are unaware, the optimal θ is always
1: The firm does not engage in efforts to reduce the amount of θ because
consumers are not aware about the possibility of adverse effects.
Therefore, when the amount of the substance is chosen by the firm, we
have an interior solution (or a corner solution with θ = 0) of the optimal
amount of the substance when the consumers are aware. In contrast, we
have a corner solution with θ = 1 when the consumers are unaware. Hence,
the result as stated in the remark holds.
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4.2 Mixed Population
So far we only considered the extreme cases in which consumers are either
fully aware or fully unaware. In this section, we study the more general sit-
uation with a mixed population. Suppose that initially a share ρ0 > 0 of
consumers is aware. We assume that advertising cannot be perfectly tar-
geted to aware consumers, and advertising thus increases the share of aware
consumers to ρ1 = ρ0 + ∆ρ with ∆ρ > 0. A special case is non-targeted
advertising in which case ρ1 = 1.
We first determine the firm’s profit-maximizing price given the share of
aware consumers ρ. A share 1 − ρ of consumers are unaware and their
expected product quality is α. The expected quality of the aware consumers
is equal to eaN if there is no advertising and a otherwise. Given the quadratic
utility of the consumers, we derive the demand function as q (p) = ea − p,
where ea is the aware consumers’ expected quality.
The firm’s expected demand function is therefore
Q (p) =
½
(1− ρ) (α− p) + ρ (ea− p) if p < ea,
(1− ρ) (α− p) if p ≥ ea.
The expected demand function has a kink at the point p = ea. The firm’s
problem is maxp pQ (p). The profit-maximizing price is
p =
½
(1−ρ)α+ρha
2
if ea ≥ a,
α
2
if ea < a,
where a =
√
1−ρ(1−
√
1−ρ)
ρ α. The corresponding profit is
π =
(
[(1−ρ)α+ρha]2
4
if ea ≥ a,
(1−ρ)α2
4
if ea < a. (11)
In words, if ea is large enough, then the firm will sell its product to aware and
unaware consumers, and it determines the profit-maximizing price as if it
was facing only consumers with expected quality that is equal to the average
quality (1− ρ)α + ρea. On the other hand, if ea is small the firm will only
sell its product to unaware consumers and the firm sets its price as if it was
facing 1− ρ of consumers with expected quality α.9
The threshold value a here is decreasing in ρ. Hence, if the firm chooses to
serve both types of consumers in the case of no advertising, so does it in the
9Note that, for ea = a, there are two solutions to the maximization problem; for conve-
nience, we selected one of them.
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case of advertising. It is worth mentioning that the firm will lower its price
for a larger share of aware consumers since it prefers to serve both types of
consumers. This benefits all consumers including those who remain unaware.
For the ease of exposition, we assume zero (exogenous) disclosure cost
and suppose that x = 1–i.e., the substance is harmful with probability one.
Then the firm advertises if and only if his profit with advertising is higher
than that without advertising, which gives a cutoff value ba such that the
firm advertises if and only if a ≥ ba. Note that in the extreme case with
only aware consumers there would be full unravelling, since we consider the
special case of zero exogenous disclosure costs. But this does not hold with
mixed population, as information disclosure takes place only for a low level
of the harmful substance.
We distinguish two cases: In case 1, the firm sells to both types of con-
sumers if it chooses not to advertise. In case 2, the firm sells only to unaware
consumers if it chooses not to advertise. Notice that the firm will serve both
types of consumers if it chooses to advertise.
Let us consider case 1–i.e., the firm sells to both types if it does not
advertise. In this case, the firm with product quality ba would choose to sell
to both types of consumers no matter whether it advertises. According to
equation 11, the threshold value ba is determined as follows¡
(1− ρ0)α+ ρ0 ea+α−12
¢2
4
=
((1− ρ1)α+ ρ1ba)2
4
.
The left-hand side of the equation is the firm’s profit in case of no adver-
tisement, while the right-hand side refers to the counterpart when the firm
advertises. The firm with quality ba is indifferent between advertising and not
advertising. We obtain ba = α− ρ0
ρ0 + 2∆ρ
. (12)
From (12) we know that the upside of advertising is that it enables the
firm to distinguish itself from firms with higher levels of the harmful sub-
stance and, thereby, obtain a higher profit, facing aware consumers. The
downside of advertising from the firm’s point of view is that some initially
unaware consumers become aware of the adverse effect. We observe that ba
is increasing in ∆ρ and decreasing in ρ0: The firm’s benefit from advertis-
ing increases with the fraction of initially aware consumers, while the cost
increases with the additional share of consumers who become aware as the
result of the advertising.
We observe that ba > α − 1 if ∆ρ > 0. This means that, as long as
advertising makes some consumers aware of the harmful substance, there
will not be full unravelling even if the exogenous disclosure cost is zero.
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Case 1 applies if the condition eaN = ea+α−12 ≥ a holds. We, thus, must
have
α ≥ A ≡ ρ0 (ρ0 +∆ρ)¡
ρ0 −
√
1− ρ0
¡
1−
√
1− ρ0
¢¢
(ρ0 + 2∆ρ)
.
We observe that the critical value A that separates case 1 from case 2 is first
increasing and then decreasing in ρ0 but strictly decreasing in ∆ρ.
Let us now consider case 2–i.e., the firm sells only to unaware consumers
if it does not advertise. In this case, according to equation 11, the threshold
value ba above is given by
(1− ρ0)α2
4
=
((1− ρ1)α+ ρ1ba)
4
,
where the left-hand side is the firm’s profit in the case of no advertising and
the right-hand side is that in the case of advertising. The above equation
gives ba = √1− ρ0 − (1− ρ0 −∆ρ)
ρ0 +∆ρ
α. (13)
The condition of serving both types of consumers requires ba > a. One
can check that this inequality holds as long as ρ1 ≥ ρ0. The condition of
serving only unaware consumers requires eaN < a, which can be rewritten as
α < A, where A has been defined above.
We summarize our findings in this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that a share ρ of consumers is initially aware and
advertising informs not only aware consumers but also a share of unaware
consumers ∆ρ.
i) A firm with a high product quality a will advertise, whereas a firm with
a low product quality a will not even if the cost of advertising is zero.
ii) If α and ∆ρ are large and ρ0 is either small or large, the firm will
sell to both aware and unaware consumers no matter whether the firm
advertises or not. For small α and ∆ρ, and intermediate ρ0, the firm will
sell only to unaware consumers if and only if it does not advertise.
Part i of the proposition reflects that the firm faces an endogenous dis-
closure cost when there is a mixed population and there is only partial un-
ravelling.10 According to part ii of the proposition, case 1–i.e., the situation
10Notice that ba < α. Hence, for some realization of the quality, the firm will advertise.
However, this does not hold when the exogenous advertising cost is strictly positive–
i.e., c > 0. Indeed, if ρ0 is small and ∆ρ is large–i.e., initially only a small share of
consumers are aware, and advertising increases this share significantly–then the benefit
of advertising is too small even for the firm with sufficiently high quality. Thus the firm
optimally chooses not to advertise if advertising is sufficiently costly.
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that the firm will serve both aware and unaware consumers even if it does
not advertise–is more likely to occur when (1) the product’s highest quality
is large, (2) advertising significantly increases the share of aware consumers,
(3) the fraction of initial aware consumer is either very small or very large.
Recall that case 1 would applies if the aware consumers’ expected quality
in the absence of advertisement, eaN , exceeds a threshold value a. Increasing
α has two effects. First, it increases the aware consumers’ expected quality in
the absence of advertising eaN . Second, it also increases the threshold value
a at the same time. The first effect, however, dominates the second one.
As a result, case 1 is more likely to happen as α increases. Now consider
an increase in ∆ρ. Because advertising makes more consumers aware, even
firms with high product quality are reluctant to advertise. Taking this into
account, aware consumers would increase their expected product quality in
the absence of advertising. On the other hand, an increase in ∆ρ has no
effect on the threshold value a. Consequently, increasing ∆ρ makes case 1
more likely to occur. The effect of an increase in ρ0, however, is ambiguous.
Both eaN and a are decreasing in ρ0. The decreasing rate of eaN is larger
(smaller) than that of a when ρ0 is small (large). Thus, case 1 is more likely
for small and large ρ0.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presented a simple monopoly model to compare the effect of a
potentially harmful substance in a market with aware in contrast to un-
aware consumers. We found that total surplus may be larger if consumers
are unaware of the harmful substance. This makes them buy too much,
which partly corrects for the underconsumption under monopoly. More im-
portantly, we show that full mandatory disclosure may be harmful in the
context of unaware consumers and that partial mandatory disclosure may be
welfare-superior.
We motivated our analysis by referring to potentially harmful substances.
More generally, our analysis applies to products which affect consumers’ util-
ities although they may not be aware of this at the moment of purchase. In
particular, it applies to complex products about which information is, in prin-
ciple, available, but about which consumers may suffer from biased beliefs at
the moment of purchase.11
11Our analysis can also be seen as a reduced-form model of add-on pricing, where con-
sumers may be adversely surprised by the add-on costs–e.g., of cartridges after buying a
printer or of watching in-room movies in a hotel.
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Whether a certain action is to be considered mis-selling depends on con-
sumer behavior. In a Bayesian world, consumers may lack information but
they use correct beliefs given their information. Therefore, they cannot
be systematically misled. This also means that non-disclosure and other
attempts to hide unfavorable information, does not lead to systematically
wrong purchase decision. By contrast, if consumers are unaware of certain
product characteristics, the possibility of mis-selling arises. Here, informa-
tion may be systematically suppressed by a firm. In this context, mandatory
testing and disclosure rules are an important policy instrument to protect
consumers. In case of non-compliance harsh punishments may be the only
means to deter a firm from ignoring such consumer protection policies. At-
tempts to encourage information gathering by consumers have little relevance
if consumers are completely naive in the sense that they are over-confident
about their knowledge of the products and believe that adverse effects cannot
materialize.
Empirical evidence by Jin and Leslie (2003) is in line with our argument.
They consider the effect of a mandatory disclosure rule that, starting 1998,
applied to restaurants in parts of Los Angeles: Restaurants were forced to
make prominent the results of hygiene inspections by displaying a grade card
in a restaurant window. They found that average hygiene scores improved,
the number of hospitalization due to food poisoning went down and consumer
demand became more sensitive to changes in hygiene. In particular, the third
finding is consistent with consumers initially not being aware of the health
risks involved. Thus, the key impact of the mandatory disclosure rule may
have been direct and indirect effects of increased consumer awareness of the
health risks.12
Our theory not only applies to how a product directly affects consumers
but to the type of production processes that is used and the type of labor
contracting within the firm and in vertical supply relationships. To be ap-
plicable, the utility that a consumer derives must depend on the use of inputs
and contracts that the firm uses. This is the case if the utility function re-
flects ethical and environmental concerns. Cases in point are the disrespect
12Two caveats are in order: First, we do not claim that the findings in Jin and Leslie
(2003) contradict the Bayesian model. However, the fact that the policy intervention was
triggered by a hidden-camera expose done by a local television news channel indicates
that initial consumer unawareness has contributed to the observed effects of the policy
intervention. Second, we admit that our model did neither include the incentive aspect
of mandatory disclosure nor the analysis of reputation effect absent disclosure through
the display of grade cards. As indicated in the modified simple model that includes
moral hazard, the distribution of restaurant types endogenously changes due to the policy
intervention, which then leads to an improved average record of restaurant hygiene.
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of standards in labor contracts such as the use of child labor or forced labor
(as exemplified by hand-woven carpets and textiles–recall, for instance, past
media coverage on sweat shops for products by Nike), the health and safety
risks for workers (this applies, e.g., to mining products and textiles–a re-
cent concrete example is jeans dying in Turkey), disrespect of environmental
standards (e.g., in case of textiles and cleaning products), disrespect of indige-
nous rights (as happened in case of oil extraction), and animal experiments
(e.g., for cosmetics).13 Under mandatory partial information disclosure, the
government (or NGOs) makes consumers aware of the possible disrespect of
certain standards. Such awareness campaigns make consumers aware of the
relevance of a certain product characteristic that enters the consumer’s util-
ity function (directly or through peer effects). It is up to the firms to certify
that they follow certain business practices and comply with the standard.
Such processes are often certified by third parties. This hints at a potential
complementarity between mandatory information disclosure and private cer-
tification efforts: Partial public information disclosure may be necessary to
make private certification efforts viable in market equilibrium.14
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In case 1, we have that
TSA − TSU
= x
µZ ea
α−1
(g (eaN , a)− g (α, a)) da+ Z α
ea
(g (a, a)− g (α, a)) da
¶
− ((1− x) + (α− ba)) c.
TSA−TSU is negative if ea is small enough. The other sufficient condition
for TSA − TSU < 0 is 3ba+ α− 3 > 0, which holds for sufficiently large α.
13A concrete example are the “war diamonds” from Congo; here consumers were con-
cerned about the effect of upstream profits on the suffering of people, as a consequence
of war that was financed through these profits. In this context NGOs play an important
role in raising awareness; a firm’s response consists in certifying the origin of inputs: De
Beers certification efforts of the origin of its diamonds can be seen as a response to the
consumers being aware that they may be buying war diamonds (which does not make a
nice wedding gift).
14Whether private certification is fully revealing is a different issue. See Biglaiser (1993)
and Lizzeri (1999) on this issue.
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Conversely, TSA − TSU is positive for sufficiently small α. To show this
possibility, consider the extreme case of condition (4) in case 1–i.e., α =
1− 2√c. We have that ba = 1− α, and
TSA − TSU |α=1−2√c= x (1− α) 2α
2 − (2α− 1)2
8
− ((1− x) + (2α− 1)) c,
which is more likely to be positive for larger x.
Let x = 1. We have that
TSA − TSU |α=1−2√c,x=1= (1− α) 2α
2 − (2α− 1)2
8
− (2α− 1) (1− α)
2
4
.
Assumption 1 becomes
(1− α)2
4
<
4α− 1
16
which is equivalent to 1
2
< α < 5
2
. Since, in the extreme case, α = 1 − 2√c
and c > 0, 1
2
< α < 1. We receive
TSA − TSU |α=1
2
,x=1=
1
128
> 0.
Since TSA− TSU is continuous function of x, α and c, we know that TSA−
TSU is positive for (x, α, c) in some vicinity of the point (1, 1/2, 1/16).
Regarding the consumer surplus, we have that
CSA − CSU = x
µZ ea
α−1
f (eaN , a)− f (α, a) da+ Z α
ea
f (a, a)− f (α, a) da
¶
.
We have f (a, a)−f (α, a) > 0 since α > a.Therefore, we have
R α
ea f (a, a)−
f (α, a) da > 0. Moreover,
sign
µZ ea
α−1
f (eaN , a)− f (α, a) da¶
= sign
Ã¡ba2 − (α− 1)2¢ (eaN − α)
4
− 3 (ba− (α− 1)) (ea2N − α2)
8
!
= sign
µ
−(ba+ (α− 1))
4
+
3 (eaN + α)
8
¶
= sign
µ
−2 (ba+ (α− 1)) + 3µba+ α− 1
2
+ α
¶¶
= sign (5α+ 1− ba) > 0.
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Thus CSA − CSU is always positive.
In case 2, it is straightforward to show that
∂ (TSA − TSU)
∂x
=
1
8
¡¡
2 + α− 4
√
c−
¡
α2 − 2α
√
c+ 4c
¢¢
2
√
c+
¡
2 + α− 4
√
c
¢
(1− α)α
¢
+
¡
1−
¡
α− 2
√
c
¢¢
c
>
1
8
¡
2 + α− 4
√
c−
¡
α2 − 2α
√
c+ 4c
¢¢
2
√
c
(since α > 2
√
c), which is greater than
1
8
¡
2 + α (1− α)− 4
√
c
¢
2
√
c > 0
since c < 1
16
(because in case 2 we have 2
√
c < α < 1− 2√c).
Lastly, we have
CSA − CSU = x
Z α
ea
(f (a, a)− f (α, a)) da > 0.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In case 1 (i.e., eaN ≥ 0),
CSM − CSA = −
xB1
648
where
B1 ≡ 216c
3
2 − (α− 1)
¡
19 (α− 1)2 − 72c
¢
− 6 (α− 1)2
q
12c+ (α− 1)2 − 2
¡
12c+ (α− 1)2
¢ 3
2
which can be positive or negative as shown in Figure 1. The figure also reveals
that, on the set of admissible (α, c)-combinations, this difference tends to be
positive for high values of c.
In case 2 (i.e., eaN < 0),
CSM − CSA = −
xB2
648
where
B2 ≡ 216c
3
2−(α− 1)
¡
13 (α− 1)2 + 144c
¢
−
¡
14 (α− 1)2 + 96c
¢q
12c+ (α− 1)2
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Figure 1: Information disclosure about product quality and consumer surplus
which is always negative. We also recall that CSA > CSU . Thus consumers
also benefit from information disclosure to the realization of I only. With
respect to full disclosure we observe that CSM > CSU only holds for a subset
of the parameter space.α
CSM − CSU = −
xB3
24
,
where
B3 ≡ 8c
3
2 − α3 − 6α+ 3α2.
The condition B3 < 0 is equivalent to
c < (
3
4
α− 3
8
α2 +
1
8
α3)
2
3 .
We can show that, under Assumption 1, B3 < 0.
Thus, in case 1, when B3 < 0 and B1 > 0, we have that CSU < CSM <
CSA. This means that mandatory information disclosure leads to a larger
consumer surplus for ex ante unaware consumers. However, consumers gain
if, instead of full disclosure, only partial disclosure is mandated. Overall
the following two orderings are possible: (i) CSU < CSM < CSA and (ii)
CSU < CSA < CSM .
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